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Abstract Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2001) develop and empirically
test a model that analyzes the effect the type of listing contract,
either exclusive agency (EA) or exclusive right to sell (ERTS),
has on the performance of the agent/broker. This paper extends
the work of Rutherford et al. and looks at differences between
housing submarkets delineated by price. The results show a
selling price discount associated with both broker-effected and
owner-effected sales for lower-priced houses with EA contracts.
For higher-priced houses, there is no price advantage to an EA-
listing if the broker achieves the sale, but if the owner sells the
house, there is a modest price premium associated with the sale.
The primary implication of the results is that owners of lower-
priced houses should be wary of alternative listing arrangements,
namely EA contracts.
Introduction
In the interests of house sellers, the performance of real estate brokers is typically
assessed by two inter-related measures: time-on-the-market (TOM) and selling
price. Relatively speaking, the best performing brokers will sell properties faster
and/or at higher prices. Economic search theory establishes the trade-off between
price and TOM. Sellers get their best prices by being patient, thus incurring a
longer TOM. Conversely, houses that sell faster typically sell at a discount.
There is an extensive literature on the role of brokerage in the residential real
estate market (see Benjamin, Jud and Sirmans, 2000; and Yavas, 1992a; for
summaries). Many studies have focused on the effort levels of the broker. Broker
participation partially substitutes for the effort levels and expended resources of
both buyers and sellers (Yavas, 1992b). Geltner, Kluger and Miller (1991) examine
broker effort and ﬁnd that broker effort is less than optimal at the beginning of a
listing contract and that the ﬁnite duration of listing contracts motivates broker
effort. There is also evidence that brokers get better prices, but that the increase
in price does not cover the typical commission (Jud and Frew, 1986).
When a property owner decides to use the services of a real estate broker to sell
the property, the listing contract formalizes the agency relationship with the broker.278  Rutherford, Springer and Yavas
The exclusive-right-to-sell (ERTS) listing is the most common listing arrangement.
With this listing, the agent/broker receives a commission if the house sells or if
a signed purchase-and-sale agreement is obtained prior to the expiration of the
listing contract. This listing is popular with Multiple Listing Services (MLSs)
because it offers the strongest guarantee of a commission. Other listing
arrangements allow the seller to avoid a commission if the seller is responsible
for achieving the sale. One such arrangement is the exclusive-agency (EA) listing.
In this contract, the seller reserves the right to sell the property without the use
of a broker and not pay a commission. However, similar to the ERTS listing, the
listing broker (the exclusive agent) receives the commission if any real estate
broker achieves the sale prior to contract expiration. Then, the commission, under
MLS guidelines, is split among cooperating brokers.
Regardless of the type of marketing arrangement, as Anglin and Arnott (1991:
112–113) note, the seller bears all of the price risk. Thus, the performance of
different marketing approaches is of primary interest to the seller of the property.
Geltner, Kluger and Miller (1991) note a potential and serious conﬂict of interest
that can result near the end of the listing contract. They also conclude that seller
self-education regarding property value can mitigate this conﬂict. The authors
further acknowledge that sellers may not be accustomed to the pressure of
negotiation and may be prone to accepting ﬁrst offers that may be suboptimal.
Given that the broker does not earn compensation with a FSBO (for sale by owner)
arrangement and the lower probability of earning a commission with an EA listing,
the ERTS arrangement is clearly the listing broker’s preference. However, even
though the ERTS listing is preferred, the listing broker will engage in EA contracts
because the broker can list the property, expend minimal effort and still have a
nonzero probability of earning a commission. Given an EA listing, the listing
broker is motivated to select properties or contractual conditions that minimize
the probability of the owner selling the property without the broker’s assistance,
leading to no compensation for the broker. Generally, these conditions are likely
to occur in thin markets or with atypical properties where the seller faces a
decreased likelihood of locating a buyer and the broker’s services are more highly
valued. These conditions are also present when the listing broker already has
contact with a probable buyer through the course of regular business.
Arnold (1999) looks into pricing and its relationship to the outcomes of a real
estate sale. He concludes that ‘‘while an increase in seller patience unambiguously
increases the seller’s expected return, it is possible that a more patient seller may
actually have a shorter marketing time than a less patient seller.’’For an EA listing,
the seller’s lack of negotiating expertise may result in accepting sub-optimal offers
to ensure not paying a commission. However, if the seller prices the property
appropriately, Arnold offers evidence that shorter marketing times can be achieved
without sacriﬁce of price. Given that the EA contract is a hybrid arrangement
between an ERTS listing and a FSBO property, it is possible that the sellers using
this arrangement are trying to get the best of both worlds.Impact of Contract Type on Broker Performance  279
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Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2001) develop and empirically test a model that
analyzes the effect the type of listing contract has on the performance of the agent/
broker. ERTS and EA contracts are compared. The results show that overall,
houses sell faster and at marginally lower prices under EA contracts than for ERTS
contracts. Also, EA-listed houses are priced lower initially than ERTS-listed
houses. Secondary results show differences according to whether the house was
new or a resale house and to whether a house was ultimately sold by a broker or
the owner. Their results show that EA-listed houses ultimately sold by the owner
take longer to sell, but generally sell at a premium to those sold under ERTS
contracts.
This paper extends the work of Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2001) and looks
at differences between housing submarkets delineated by price. Arguments are
developed around the difference in listing agreements and how the contracts
should differently affect the sale of lower- and higher-priced houses. A large data
set of MLS transactions allows for empirical investigation. First, to better model
parameter instability between housing submarkets segmented by price, Quandt’s
(1958) switching regimes model is used to determine the most likely break-price
to delineate lower- and higher-priced houses. Next, Probit models are estimated
to generate self-selection correction variables and to ascertain the inﬂuence of
certain property and market characteristics on the choice of either an EA or an
ERTS listing contract. Finally, simultaneous equations models are estimated, then
corrected for self-selection and heteroscedasticity of selling price and TOM for
houses under alternative contracts.
The results of the simultaneous equations model show that for TOM, the results
are very similar for lower- and higher-priced houses. In both price ranges, EA
contracts resulted in faster broker-effected sales with owner-effected sales resulting
in longer marketing times. The results further show that lower-priced houses
(selling price $87,500) with EA listings sold at a discount, completely in line
with the expected trade-off between price and TOM. The price discount is
associated with both broker-effected and owner-effected sales. For higher-priced
houses, there was no signiﬁcant overall price effect accompanying the reduced
TOM. For higher-priced houses, the results show no clear advantage to an EA
listing if the broker sells the house. However, if the owner sells the house, there
is an associated price premium of approximately 1.2%.
The results imply that owners of lower-priced houses should be wary of alternative
listing arrangements, namely EA contracts, because there appears to be no relative
beneﬁt associated with the higher probability of not being required to pay a
commission. However, the results suggest it is advantageous to the owner of a
higher-priced house to seek a broker willing to engage in this type of listing
arrangement.280  Rutherford, Springer and Yavas
 A Simple Model
This section provides a simple model to study the relationship between the market
price of a property and the relative attractiveness of the two listing contracts. The
model is a modiﬁed version of the one in Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2001).
The seller and the respective broker have to search in order to ﬁnd a buyer. The
seller ﬁrst decides whether to sign an EA contract or an ERTS contract with the
broker. Given the seller’s contract choice, the seller and the broker then choose
their effort levels. Since the seller’s choice of the contract type will affect the
broker’s effort choice, the seller has to conjecture the impact on the broker’s effort
level before deciding on the contract type.
Assume that the seller takes the price of the property as given (i.e., assume that
the price is determined by the supply and demand in the market). This will allow
an examination of how the relative attractiveness of the two contract types varies
between housing submarkets delineated by price. Let S  [0,L] and  [0,L] denote
the seller’s and the broker’s search intensity choice, respectively, where L is a
ﬁnite upper bound on the search intensities. The probability that either the seller
or the broker contacts the buyer is given by   (S,B) where 0 (S,B)  1⁄2 for
∀ S and B, whereas the probability that the buyer is contacted by the broker is
given by (B) where 0  (B)  1⁄2 for ∀ B. Clearly, (B) is a subset of (S,B),
(B)  (S,B)  ∀ S and B. The probability functions  and  have the properties
that S  0, B  0, B  0, SS  0, BB  0, BS  0 and BB  0, where
subscripts denote the corresponding (partial) derivatives. The cost of search is
given by (S) for the seller and (B) for the broker, where  and  are strictly
increasing and convex with S(0)  B(0)  0. The matching technology and
the cost functions are common knowledge.
When the property is sold, the seller receives a surplus of R where R equals the
selling price minus the seller’s reservation value of the property. The seller’s
expected return under an EA contract is given by:
S-E  (S,B)  (S,B)R  (B)kP  (S), (1)
where k is the commission rate and P is the value of the property. The ﬁrst two
terms represent the fact that the seller enjoys R upon the sale of the property but
has to pay a commission to the broker if the buyer is contacted by the broker.
It is clear from Equation (1) that the seller’s expected payoff under an EA contract
depends on the broker’s effort choice as well as the effort choice of the seller.
Thus, the seller needs to determine the effort choice of the broker before deciding
on the contract type. The seller knows that the broker under an EA contract will
choose an effort level, B, which maximizes:Impact of Contract Type on Broker Performance  281
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B-EA  (S,B)  (B)kP  (B). (2)
Equation (2) is simply the expected commission revenue of the broker minus the
broker’s search costs.
If the seller signs an ERTS with the broker, then the seller’s expected return is
given by:
S-ERTS  (s,b)  (s,b)( R  kP)  (s). (3)
The difference from the EA contract is that the seller now pays the brokerage
commission even if the seller ﬁnds the buyer himself.2 The seller also knows that
the broker’s effort choice under an ERTS contract will maximize:
B-ERTS  (s,b)  (s,b)kP  (b). (4)
The ﬁrst-order conditions under EA contract are obtained by maximizing Equation
(1) with respect to S and maximizing Equation (2) with respect to B:
 R  S  0 (5) S
and
 kP  B  0 (6) B
where the arguments of the probability functions and their partials have been
suppressed for notational ease.
Similarly, the ﬁrst order conditions under the exclusive right-to-sell contract are
obtained by maximizing Equation (3) with respect to s and maximizing Equation
(4) with respect to bi s :
 (R  kP)  s  0 (7) s
and282  Rutherford, Springer and Yavas
 kP    0. (8) bb
It is clear that in equilibrium the seller expends a greater search effort under the
EA contract than under the exclusive right-to-sell contract, S*  s*. Whether the
same is true for the broker, on the other hand, will depend on b versus B, i.e.,
whether an increase in the broker’s effort level will have a greater impact on the
overall probability of ﬁnding the buyer or on the probability that the broker will
ﬁnd the buyer. If b  () B for any B  b, then B*  () b*.
In order to determine how the impact of the contract choice on the effort levels
varies between housing submarkets delineated by price, we need to examine how
a change in the property value P affects the equilibrium effort levels of the seller
and the broker under the two contract types. Let dR/dP 	 0 so that the seller’s
surplus from the sale of the property is a non-decreasing function of the market
value of the property. Given the properties of the probability functions  and ,
differentiating the four ﬁrst-order conditions 5–8 with respect to P will yield the
following:
 Remark:
1. dS*/dP 	 ds*/dP 	 0: An increase in P results in an increase in the
seller’s effort level under both contract types, but the increase will be
greater under the EA contract than under the exclusive right to sell
contract.
2. dB*/dP 	 0, db*/dP 	 0 and dB*/dP 	 ()d b*/dP for BB  0 	
() BB  0: An increase in P results in an increase in the broker’s effort
level under both contract types, but the increase will be greater (smaller)
under the EA contract when the increase in the effort level generates a
bigger (smaller) drop in the marginal probability B than B.
As stated in the second part of the Remark, the key for the impact of an increase
in P on the broker’s effort level under the two contract types is the second partial
derivatives of the probability functions  and  with respect to the broker’s effort
level. If a higher effort level by the broker leads to a bigger decrease in the
marginal probability B than the marginal probability B, it will produce the
following result:
 Claim:
For BB  0 	 () BB  0, an increase in the value of a property leads to a
greater increase in both the seller’s and the broker’s effort levels under the EA
contract than under the ERTS contract.Impact of Contract Type on Broker Performance  283
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A higher effort level by both parties will translate to a shorter TOM. Although
the price of the property is determined in the market as a general rule, the seller’s
and/or the broker’s effort level may have some inﬂuence on the outcome of the
price negotiations with the buyer. The seller may also agree to a price discount
vis-a `-vis the market value in order to achieve a quicker sale. Thus, the implication
of the above Claim is that the EA contract offers a better (TOM, negotiated price)
combination to more expensive properties than to less expensive properties. This
implication will be tested empirically in the following section.
 Methodology
To establish the delineation point between lower-priced and higher-priced housing,
Quandt’s (1958) switching regimes model is employed for two regimes. Basically,
the data are sorted by selling price and split at observation, r, and regressions are
run on each of the two price-delineated samples. Quandt’s log-likelihood ratio
(LLR) test is used to detect the most probable price at which to separate the two
regression regimes. The LLR test statistic is:
22 2 11 1   ⁄2 r log 
  ⁄2 (T  r) log 
  ⁄2 T log 
 , (9) 12
where , and 
2 are the ratios of the residual sums of squares to the number 22 

 12
of observations for the regressions on the ﬁrst r observations, the remaining T 
r observations and all T observations, respectively. The minimum value of  is
associated with the most likely location of the point at which the regression
relationship switches.3
Once the most likely switchpoint is established, the Chow test is used to
statistically verify that the two price-delineated models differ from one another.
The Chow (F) statistic is calculated as:
F  {[SSR  (SSR  SSR )]/(SSR  SSR )} C 1212 (10)
 {(N  N  2k)/k}, 12
where SSR1, SSR2, SSRC, N1, N2 and N are the sum of the squared residuals and
the number of observations for the individual and the combined models, and k is
the number of parameters.
Once the two price-delineated housing submarkets have been identiﬁed, the
separate Probit models are estimated. The primary purpose of the Probit models
is to generate self-selection correction variables (Inverse Mill’s Ratios) for later284  Rutherford, Springer and Yavas
use in the simultaneous equations models of selling price. To a limited extent, the
Probit models permit a determination of the inﬂuence of certain property and
market characteristics on the seller’s choice of either an EA or an ERTS listing
contract.
Finally, a two-equation simultaneous equations model is used to estimate the effect
that EA listings have on TOM and selling price. The ﬁrst equation of the model
regresses the log of TOM against various factors including the type of listing
contract. The second stage regresses the log of selling price against a similar set
of factors. The two equations in the simultaneous equations model are:
ln(DOM)  f(ln(SP), X, EA), (11)
and
ln(SP)  f(ln(DOM), X, EA), (12)
where:
DOM  Days on the market;
SP  Selling price;
X  A vector of variables describing physical characteristics, location, market
conditions, and marketability factors similar to other hedonic housing
models; and
EA  A dummy variable indicating exclusive agency listings.
Equation (11) allows assessment of the impact of different contract types on the
marketing time of single-family houses marketed through an MLS. Equation (12)
equation allows for a test of the impact of the different contract types on the
selling prices of single-family houses sold through an MLS. To correct for possible
selection bias related to the choice of contract, the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) was
derived using a Probit model and included in the simultaneous equation models
of selling price and TOM to correct for selection bias. The dependent variable for
the Probit was the choice of using an EA contract (dummy variable  1) versus
the choice of using an ERTS contract. Heteroscedasticity was also detected using
White’s test, thus the standards errors of all regressions have been corrected for
heteroskedasticity using the Huber/White/Eicker estimates of variance as
indicated in Wooldridge (2003).
 Data
The model is estimated with data from Rutherford et al. (2001). The ﬁnal sample,
after removal of missing and incomplete observations and some outliers, consistsImpact of Contract Type on Broker Performance  285
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of 49,219 observations of MLS housing transactions from the Dallas-Fort Worth
MLS covering the period of 1994 to 1997. Exclusive agency listing comprised
11.6 percent (5732 observations) of the total sample with the remainder of the
observations being exclusive right to sell contracts. Of the EA contracts, 1564 or
27.3 percent were sold by a MLS nonmember, presumably the owner of the
property. The data were divided into two parts to ascertain differences between
the EA and ERTS subsamples. Univariate t-tests show that, on average, EA listings
are not statistically different from ERTS listings with respect to selling price, list
price, time-on-the-market, age, and square footage.4
Using Quandt’s (1958) technique to delineate the breakpoint in the data, the log-
likelihood ratio for the selling price model is minimized at a selling price of
$87,500.5 The Chow test statistically veriﬁes the resulting models are different at
the 1% level or better. At this breakpoint, there are 23,709 observations in the
sample of smaller houses (those that sold for less than $87,500) and 25,510 houses
in the sample of larger houses (those that sold for at least $87,500).
A look at the data (Exhibit 1) shows that the higher-priced houses had a slightly
lower percentage of EA contracts than the lower-priced houses. T-test results show
that, compared to lower-priced houses, higher-priced houses have approximately
the same percentage of listings with EA contracts, with a higher percentage of
these EA listings sold by a nonMLS member, presumably the owner/seller, rather
than a broker. On the other hand, lower-priced houses with EA contracts were
more likely than the higher-priced houses with EA listings to have been sold by
a broker. Also, the higher-priced houses were more likely to be larger and newer
than lower-priced houses. The lower-priced houses were more likely to be older
and vacant and were more overpriced than the higher-priced houses. Exhibit 1
summarizes the data.
 Results and Implications
A Probit Model of Contract Choice
The results of a simple Probit model provide some insight to the choice of listing
contract. The data limit the analysis to whether the choice is affected by physical
house characteristics or market attributes. The variable, Newer, accounts for the
higher percentage of builder-owned houses for houses less than a year old. The
results (Exhibit 2) show that the probability of a lower-priced ($87,500) house
being listed with an EA contract decreases with the size of the house and is
substantially higher for newer (builder-owned) homes in comparison to resale
houses. This size effect correlates positively with price and perceived quality and
is further enhanced by the negative coefﬁcients for garages and large lots. Six of
nine geographic indicators had signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. For the sample of higher-
priced houses, the probability of a house being listed with an EA contract increases
slightly with square footage, is lower for larger lots and is substantially higher for2
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Exhibit 1  Summary Statistics of the Data
Lower-priced Houses Higher-priced Houses
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev T-Test Description
DOM 97.86 64.26 96.35 61.50 *** Time on the market (in days)
Selling Price 64,501 14,091 150,534 65,264 *** Selling price (in dollars)
List Price 66,791 14,447 155,080 67,290 *** Listing price (in dollars)
Overpricing 3.709 5.038 3.076 3.697 *** Percentage by which list price exceeds selling price
Age 24.10 14.64 11.88 11.66 *** Age of house (in years)
Newer 0.014 0.116 0.113 0.317 *** 1 if Age  1 year
Older 0.488 0.500 0.154 0.361 *** 1 if Age  1 year
Sq. Ft. (/100) 15.04 7.99 24.27 11.55 *** Square feet of living area
Bedroom 2.98 0.45 3.54 0.61 *** Number of bedrooms
Bathroom 1.896 0.444 2.684 0.745 *** Number of bathrooms
Vacant 0.041 0.197 0.015 0.123 *** 1 if vacant, 0 if not
Garage 0.798 0.401 0.908 0.289 *** 1 if garage, 0 if not
Fireplace 0.381 0.486 0.048 0.214 *** 1 if 1 or more ﬁreplaces
Large Lot 0.029 0.169 0.072 0.258 *** 1 if lot size exceeds 1 acre
Pool 0.057 0.232 0.219 0.414 *** 1 if pool
Lakefront 0.022 0.148 0.056 0.229 *** 1 if lakefrontI
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Exhibit 1  (continued)
Summary Statistics of the Data
Lower-priced Houses Higher-priced Houses
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev T-Test Description
Well-maintained 0.033 0.177 0.017 0.129 *** 1 if comments include ‘well-maintained’
List-Spring 0.295 0.456 0.299 0.458 — 1 if listed in the Spring (2nd quarter)
List-Summer 0.239 0.426 0.238 0.426 — 1 if listed in the Summer (3rd quarter)
List-Fall 0.158 0.365 0.151 0.358 ** 1 if listed in the Fall (4th quarter)
Sale-Spring 0.195 0.396 0.190 0.392 — 1 if sold in the Spring (2nd quarter)
Sale-Summer 0.289 0.453 0.287 0.453 — 1 if sold in the Summer (3rd quarter)
Sale-Fall 0.301 0.459 0.311 0.463 ** 1 if sold in the Fall (4th quarter)
List-Time 7.836 4.351 8.374 4.395 *** 1 for each quarter listed after the ﬁrst quarter of
1994
Sale-Time 8.289 4.354 8.625 4.519 *** 1 for each quarter of sale starting in the second
quarter of 1994
Exclusive Agency 0.119 0.324 0.114 0.318 * 1 if EA listing
EA-Sale by Owner 0.029 0.168 0.034 0.182 *** 1 if sold by owner (MLS nonmember)
EA-Sale by Broker 0.090 0.286 0.080 0.270 *** 1 if sold by MLS member-broker
Notes: Means and standard deviations; along with signiﬁcance for T-test on difference in means between lower- and higher-priced samples (N  49,219
observations of houses listed on the Dallas-Fort Worth MLS and ultimately sold). Lower-priced houses: selling Price  $87,500; N  23,709. Higher-priced
Houses: selling price 	 $87,500; N  25,510.
*T-value at the 0.1 level.
**T-value at the 0.05 level.
***T-value at the 0.01 level.2
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Exhibit 2  Probit Results for the Choice of an EA Listing Rather than an ERTS Listing
Higher-priced Houses Lower-priced Houses
Variable Coefﬁcient Marginal Effect (%) Coefﬁcient Marginal Effect (%)
Constant 0.268 1.110***
Sq. Ft. (/100) 0.164*** 0.80 0.015 0.28
Sq. Ft-Sq 2.00 E-3 0.02 3.11 E-4* 0.00
Overpricing 5.08 E-3 0.05 1.67 E-3 0.03
Age 0.017 0.26 0.020 0.37
Older 0.098 1.04 0.062 1.18
Newer 0.422** 5.11 0.485*** 1.11
Bedrooms 0.074 7.85 5.90 E-3 0.11
Bathrooms 0.040 0.43 9.53 E-3 0.18
Fireplace 0.057 0.61 0.048 0.87
Garage 0.111** 1.20 0.059 1.13
Pool 0.112 1.23 6.66 E-3 0.12
Large Lot 0.292** 2.82 0.119*** 2.07
Well-maintained 0.182 1.82 0.067 1.19
Lakefront 0.244 2.38 0.035 0.66I
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Exhibit 2  (continued)
Probit Results for the Choice of an EA Listing Rather than an ERTS Listing
Higher-priced Houses Lower-priced Houses
Variable Coefﬁcient Marginal Effect (%) Coefﬁcient Marginal Effect (%)
Vacant 0.142 1.57 0.072 1.49
List-Spring 3.47 E-3 0.04 0.033 0.62
List-Summer 0.060 6.46 0.044 0.83
List-Fall 0.022 0.23 0.059* 1.11
MLS-Area 2 0.139 1.42 3.73 E-3 0.07
MLS-Area 3 0.559*** 6.92 0.488*** 11.41
MLS-Area 4 0.355*** 3.39 0.102 1.78
MLS-Area 5 0.319*** 3.17 0.013 0.24
MLS-Area 6 0.268*** 2.97 0.254*** 5.27
MLS-Area 7 0.173** 1.78 4.30 E-3 0.08
MLS-Area 8 0.228 2.59 0.501*** 12.13
MLS-Area 9 0.146 1.62 0.432*** 10.14
MLS-Area 10 0.393*** 3.69 0.227* 3.64
Notes: Table includes estimated coefﬁcients with signiﬁcance of the Chi-square-test. Lower-priced houses: selling price  $87,500; N  23,709. Higher-
priced Houses: selling price 	 $87,500; N  25,510.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.290  Rutherford, Springer and Yavas
newer houses. Five of nine geographic indicators had signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. For
both samples of houses, the probability of being listed with an EA contract varies
by location, but show little signiﬁcance over the seasons. Once again, the primary
purpose of the Probit model is to generate an Inverse Mill’s Ratio to control for
self-selection bias in the simultaneous equations model.6
Assuming a house with average traits, the marginal effect associated with each
variable is the change in the probability that a seller will select an EA contract
over an ERTS contract associated with a one unit change in the variable of interest.
For the signiﬁcant variables not associated with geographic location, the largest
effect on the probability of selecting an EA contract is associated with the variable
Newer, which is included to proxy for houses that are more likely to be builder-
owned. This result is consistent with the observation that builders sell many of
their houses without broker participation and have a preference for EA contracts.
Many of the geographic variables also had large impacts on the probability of a
seller choosing an EA contract.
Simultaneous Equations Model of Price and Time-on-the-
Market
The results for the single regression model are found in Rutherford, Springer and
Yavas (2001) and show that, overall, houses sold with EA listings sell faster, but
at a slightly lower price than houses sold with ERTS listings. For the Rutherford
et al. study, the data were separated by the age of the house being sold on the
premise that builders (new houses) are more likely to use EA contracts and to use
them for different purposes than typical sellers of resale houses. The results from
Rutherford et al. show distinct differences between new and resale houses for
price effects of listing contract choice.
This paper assesses differences for differing housing market segments based on
price. A simultaneous equations model for price and TOM was run for both lower-
priced (SP $87,500) and higher-priced (SP 	$87,500) houses.
As shown in Exhibit 3, for the TOM models of both lower-priced and higher-
priced houses, the coefﬁcient on EA is signiﬁcant and negative, suggesting that
houses listed with EA contracts sell approximately faster (4.8% for lower-priced
houses and 3.9% for higher-priced houses) than similar houses listed with ERTS
contracts.7 The results for the selling price model illustrate the primary difference
between the two samples.8 For lower-priced houses, the coefﬁcient on EA is
signiﬁcant and negative, suggesting that houses listed with EA contracts sell at
about a 1.7% discount to similar houses sold with ERTS contracts. For the selling
price model of more costly houses (those that sold for $87,500 or more), the
coefﬁcient on EA is insigniﬁcant, indicating no price effect based on the contract
choice.I
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Exhibit 3  The Results for the Estimation of Equation 1: The Impact on Time-on-the-Market
Lower-priced Houses Higher-priced Houses
Variable Impact of EA Contracts
Impact of Whether Broker or
Owner Effected the Sale Impact of EA Contracts
Impact of Whether Broker or
Owner Effected the Sale
Constant 9.818*** 9.772*** 2.122** 2.781***
ln (Selling Price) 0.519*** 0.515*** 0.191** 0.129
Sq. Ft. (/100) 0.032*** 0.032*** 4.45 E-3 7.27 E-3*
Newer 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.040 4.50 E-3
Bedrooms 4.16 E-3 4.76 E-3 1.79 E-3 2.29 E-3
Garage 0.022 0.022 0.020 0.024
Pool 1.67 E-3 3.05 E-3 0.039*** 0.034***
Lakefront 0.036 0.038 0.070*** 0.078***
Vacant 0.014 0.017 0.042 0.048
List-1995 0.118*** 0.130*** 0.033** 0.044***
List-1996 0.156*** 0.164*** 0.066*** 0.075***
List-1997 0.308*** 0.305*** 0.224*** 0.214***
List-Spring 0.108*** 0.117*** 0.107*** 0.115***
List-Summer 0.135*** 0.129*** 0.148*** 0.137***
List-Fall 0.051*** 0.045*** 0.060*** 0.047***
Area 2 0.105*** 0.102*** 0.166*** 0.174***
Area 3 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.070* 0.108***2
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Exhibit 3  (continued)
The Results for the Estimation of Equation 1: The Impact on Time-on-the-Market
Lower-priced Houses Higher-priced Houses
Variable Impact of EA Contracts
Impact of Whether Broker or
Owner Effected the Sale Impact of EA Contracts
Impact of Whether Broker or
Owner Effected the Sale
Area 5 0.020 0.023 0.109*** 0.120***
Area 6 0.074*** 0.079*** 0.159*** 0.187***
Area 7 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.062*** 0.045**
Area 8 0.136*** 0.139*** 0.159*** 0.199***
Area 9 0.165*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.222***
Area 10 0.058** 0.062** 0.252*** 0.240***
Exclusive Agency 0.056*** — 0.045*** —
EA—Sale by Owner — 0.198*** — 0.207***
EA—Sale by Broker — 0.137*** — 0.162***
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 7.79 E-3 7.64 E-3 6.92 E-3*** 9.63 E-3
R2 0.046 0.050 0.043 0.050
Notes: Table includes estimated coefﬁcients with signiﬁcance of the T-test. Dependent variable  ln (DOM). Lower-priced houses: selling price  $87,500;
N  23,709. Higher-priced Houses: selling price 	 $87,500; N  25,510.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.Impact of Contract Type on Broker Performance  293
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For both segments of the data, the results suggest that EA contracts create a race
between the broker and the owner, resulting in faster sales. This result is consistent
with the theory presented here. For lower-priced houses, the faster sale is
associated with a discount from the selling price, a result consistent with the
behavior of a motivated seller and fully supporting typical housing search models,
which postulate a trade-off between selling prices and marketing time. For the
more costly housing segment, when compared to the ERTS listing, the EA listing
offers the beneﬁt of quicker sales without a sacriﬁce in price. This result supports
a demand-driven model where buyers pay similar prices for similar houses without
regard for, and perhaps even knowledge of, the type of contract the seller uses.
This result also supports the theory here in that as selling price increases, both
sellers and brokers will increase their search effort. The evidence of this increased
effort is faster sales with no sacriﬁce to price (Arnold, 1999).
To gain more insight to the price and marketing time effects of EA listings, the
EA listings are separated according to whether the owner or a broker achieved
the sale. The data do not allow the identiﬁcation of the owner as a seller, but do
identify that an MLS nonmember was the seller. Thus, only a proxy for owner-
sold properties by the seller being an MLS nonmember can be asserted.
For the TOM model (Exhibit 3) of lower-priced houses, the coefﬁcient for broker-
sold EA-listed houses was signiﬁcant and negative, suggesting that broker-sold
EA houses sell approximately 12% faster than similar houses listed with ERTS
contracts.9 The results for owner-sold EA houses suggest that lower-priced houses
sell much slower (about 23%) than ERTS houses. The results for the selling price
model (Exhibit 4) show the coefﬁcient for broker-sold EA houses to be negative
and signiﬁcant, suggesting a 1.2% selling price discount for sellers using EA
listings. For owner-sold houses, there is a similar discount of 1.9% for EA
contracts in comparison to similar houses sold with ERTS contracts.
In summary, for lower-priced houses, houses with EA contracts sell faster on
average than houses with ERTS contracts. A broker-sold EA listing sells faster
than an owner-sold EA listing and for a slightly lower discount on price. Thus,
for lower-priced houses, the results suggest that the seller is better off using an
ERTS listing and not taking the selling price discount associated with the EA
contract.
For the TOM model of more costly houses, the coefﬁcient for broker-sold EA-
listed houses was signiﬁcant and negative, suggesting that broker-sold EA houses
sell approximately 15% faster than similar houses listed with ERTS contracts. The
results for owner-sold EA houses suggest that these houses sell more than 20%
slower than ERTS listed houses. The results for the selling price model show the
coefﬁcient for broker-sold EA houses to be insigniﬁcant, suggesting no price effect
for sellers using EA listings. For owner-sold houses, there is an estimated 1.2%
premium for houses listed with EA contracts in comparison to similar houses sold
with ERTS contracts.2
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Exhibit 4  The Results for the Estimation of Equation 2: The Impact of Contract Type on Selling Price
Lower-priced Houses Higher-priced Houses
Variable Impact of EA Contracts
Impact of Whether Broker or
Owner Effected the Sale Impact of EA Contracts
Impact of Whether Broker or
Owner Effected the Sale
Constant 10.183*** 10.183*** 10.736*** 10.739***
Ln (DOM) 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.012*** 0.012***
Sq. Ft. (/100) 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.057*** 0.057***
Sq. Ft-Sq 1.87 E-3*** 1.87 E-3*** 2.47 E-4*** 2.46 E-4***
Age 9.19 E-3*** 9.19 E-3*** 0.011*** 0.011***
Age-Sq 8.33 E-5*** 8.33 E-5*** 1.69 E-4*** 1.69 E-4***
Newer 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.064*** 0.065***
Bathrooms 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.033*** 0.033***
Bedrooms 4.64 E-3 4.64 E-3 0.054*** 0.054***
Fireplace 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.022*** 0.021***
Garage 0.054*** 0.054*** 7.95 E-3* 7.64 E-3
Pool 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.076*** 0.076***
Lakefront 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.073*** 0.073***
Vacant 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.039*** 0.039***
Sale-Spring 3.38 E-3 3.40 E-3 0.012*** 0.012***
Sale-Summer 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.018***
Sale-Fall 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.026*** 0.026***
Sale - 1995 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.020***
Sale - 1996 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.040***
Sale - 1997 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.085***I
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Exhibit 4  (continued)
The Results for the Estimation of Equation 2: The Impact of Contract Type on Selling Price
Lower-priced Houses Higher-priced Houses
Variable Impact of EA Contracts
Impact of Whether Broker or
Owner Effected the Sale Impact of EA Contracts
Impact of Whether Broker or
Owner Effected the Sale
Area 2 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.076*** 0.076***
Area 3 0.231*** 0.231*** 0.152*** 0.153***
Area 5 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.014*** 0.014***
Area 6 5.09 E-3 5.11 E-3*** 0.031*** 0.032***
Area 7 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.085***
Area 8 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.054***
Area 9 5.03 E-3 5.05 E-3 0.080*** 0.082***
Area 10 7.34 E-3 7.32 E-3 0.068*** 0.069***
Exclusive Agency 0.019*** — 1.04 E-3 —
EA—Sale by
Owner
— 0.021*** — 0.012**
EA—Sale by Broker — 0.019 — 4.28 E-3
Inverse Mill’s Ratio 2.61 E-3** 2.61 E-3** 6.01 E-3** 6.81 E-3**
R2 0.583 0.583 0.776 0.776
Notes: Table includes estimated coefﬁcients with signiﬁcance of the T-test. Dependent variable  ln (SP). Lower-priced houses: selling price  $87,500; N 
23,709. Higher-priced Houses: selling price 	 $87,500; N  25,510.
*Signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.296  Rutherford, Springer and Yavas
In summary, similar to lower-priced homes, higher-priced houses using EA listings
sell faster on average than houses with ERTS contracts. However, whereas the
owners of lower-priced houses are seemingly disadvantaged by EA contracts, these
results suggest that the sellers of more expensive houses are better served by the
use of EA listing contracts. If a broker achieves the sale, the seller realizes the
same price as with an ERTS listing, but receives a sales contract more quickly.
Also, if the seller achieves the sale, he not only saves the commission, but also
receives a higher selling price in comparison to the ERTS contract.
 Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that there are substantial differences in agent
effort and outcome given alternative listing contracts and different price ranges of
houses. For lower-priced houses, those selling for less than $87,500, the seller
should be cautious about alternative listing arrangements because they may result
in suboptimal performance by the broker. For these houses, the results show longer
marketing times associated with EA contracts, as well as a selling price discount
if a broker effects the sale. Interestingly, if the seller achieved the sale, there was
no associated discount. The results further show that sellers of higher-priced
houses are better served by the EA contracts. One implication of the results is
that brokers operating in lower-priced market segments are motivated towards not
getting the best price for the seller. This implication suggests that these brokers
might be better motivated either by a different compensation mechanism, or by a
technology, such as the Internet, which can make the selling of lower-priced
properties more efﬁcient.
 Endnotes
1 Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2001) allows the seller to choose the price, as well as
the search intensity, and shows that in equilibrium the seller chooses the same price
under the two contract types.
2 To differentiate between the search efforts under the two contract types, lowercase s and
b will be used to denote the search efforts under the ERTS contract.
3 Brown, Durbin and Evans (1975) present this version of Quandt’s (1958) log-likelihood
ratio statistic.
4 A more complete description of the full data set can be found in Rutherford, Springer
and Yavas (2001) or by request from the authors.
5 Using Quandt’s (1958) model as our basis and running OLS models at various
breakpoints for the data (based on selling price), the LLR statistic was minimized at an
$87,500 breakpoint within $250 of accuracy. Using the TOM model to determine the
breakpoint results in a switch of regression regimes at a selling price of $86,000, which
is very close to the $87,500 breakpoint for the selling price model.
6 The procedure used for the selection bias correction is commonly used (Heckman, 1979).
A Probit model is used to estimate an Inverse Mill’s Ratio, which is then entered intoImpact of Contract Type on Broker Performance  297
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the regression equation (see also William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis, third edition;
Prentice-Hall, 1997).
7 The percentage discounts are calculated by estimating the models at the sample means
and then re-estimating the model using a value of 1 for EA.
8 One interesting result from the submarket models of TOM is the difference in sign of
the log of the selling price. For lower-priced houses, marketing time decreases with price.
For higher-priced houses, marketing time increases with price. The positive effect in the
higher-priced model and the negative effect in the lower-price model suggest a distinct
nonlinear relationship between selling price and TOM and that the overall market may
be thinner at both the high and low ends. The result also provides additional validation
for the identiﬁcation of submarkets in the modeling process.
9 For the models isolating broker- and owner-effected sales, the percentage discounts are
calculated by estimating the models at the sample means and then re-estimating the model
using a value of 1 for EA-Sale by Broker and 0 for EA-Sale by Owner, and vice versa.
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